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Glossary of Abbreviations & Acronyms
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Global Leadership at a Crossroads
5
In this report, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at The Bush School of Government 
& Public Service at Texas A&M University outlines eight priority areas and their accompanying 
recommended action items to address vulnerabilities in the current pandemic preparedness and 
response system. Collectively, they represent issues the international community should address in 
order to establish pandemic preparedness and response capabilities.
A: IMPROVING CAPACITY FOR EARLY DETECTION AND RESPONSE
1. Best Practices in Management of Animal Diseases
An estimated 75% of human emerging diseases are zoonotic and most pandemics begin in animals 
and spillover into humans. Due to the highly complex and interconnected nature of disease spread, 
a One Health approach that links humans and animal disease surveillance is critical for early detec-
tion, response, and containment of outbreaks. A typical response to any report of disease, is that 
the flocks and herds of diseased animals are ordered slaughtered or culled. Livestock producers 
and subsistence farmers not able to access compensation when their animals are killed, are moti-
vated to conceal diseased animals rather than report them. Despite its common use, however, cull-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Executive Summary
ing can be challenging, especially in the austere environments of the developing world. To minimize 
these challenges, we recommend that each country have written, practical compensation guide-
lines, and that governments can be held accountable by the international community. For countries 
not financially able, the World Organization of Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) should establish 
a culling compensation fund, and the international community should explore disease prevention 
and containment options other than culling, such as vaccination and treatment.
2. Ensuring Community-Level Awareness & Action 
In order to control outbreaks at the source, it is important that communities located within disease 
“hot spots”—or areas with ecological and demographic conditions likely to produce emerging dis-
eases—have the training, education, and tools they need to identify a disease epidemic and take 
early response measures. We recommend that international non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and local universities serve as the main components for local capacity building. In making 
this recommendation, we recognize that there are inherent risks to this approach, which include 
national government hostility toward NGOs and the often clientelist structure of local universities. 
B: LIMITING HUMAN AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
3. Increasing Continuity in Supply Chains
Efficient and reliable transportation has changed the global economy and molded it into a system 
based heavily on the idea of comparative advantage. Now, countries around the world, including 
the United States, rely on “just-in-time” deliver-
ies of goods, including vital medical supplies and 
equipment. This means that inventories are kept 
low and continual delivery of goods is required. 
A failure in the global supply chain during a pan-
demic could be deadly as it proved to be during 
the Ebola epidemic that occurred in West Africa. 
We recommend that the United States determine 
and document all the components of our most 
important supply chains (i.e.—medical equip-
ment, pharmaceuticals, food) in the event of 
pandemic and considering different disease syn-
dromes (e.g., respiratory vs. blood-borne). Devel-
oping this understanding is the first step towards 
adequately protecting our global supply chains. 
 
4. Targeting Antimicrobial Resistance
Antimicrobial resistance is quickly emerging as 
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one of the greatest challenges in public health. The development of antibiotics has saved millions 
of lives and allowed for an explosion in livestock production and subsequent growth in the human 
population, but the massive overuse of these medications has also created new, resistant strains of 
bacteria that threaten both humans and livestock. To counter antimicrobial resistance, we recom-
mend investing in research and the development of new antimicrobials, creating a stronger regula-
tory system and clear guidelines for veterinary and farm use of antibiotics, decreasing the misuse 
and/or overuse of antimicrobials in human health, and understanding that fighting antimicrobial 
resistance requires a One Health approach. As part of that approach, we need to consider the 
environmental, animal and human elements of disease emergence, transmission, prevention, and 
containment.
C: MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP CAPACITY
5. Strengthening Leadership & Coordination
As we discussed in our 2017 White Paper, “The Growing Threat of Pandemics: Enhancing Domes-
tic and International Biosecurity,” leadership and coordination is critical to effective pandemic re-
sponse. In this white paper, we encourage the development of a strategic direction for international 
leadership, the development of a communication strategy, and the United States maintaining its 
involvement in global health security and pandemic preparedness.
6. Maintaining United States Involvement in Pandemic Preparedness & Global Health Security
Building on the recommendations in section five of this document, we focus on the importance of 
the United States maintaining involvement in international health security and pandemic prepared-
ness. We recommend that domestic experts frame the problem of pandemics to encourage a na-
tional defense perspective and for the United States to increase its international response capacity.
 
7. Ensuring that the Private Sector is  
Fully Involved 
The financial cost of international 
health security and pandemic pre-
paredness is significant and current 
needs are not being met. In order to 
strengthen international ability to re-
spond to disease outbreaks, govern-
ments should encourage and incen-
tivize the participation of the private 
sector. To help increase private 
sector involvement, we recommend 
greater economic investment and 
incentive policies from governments 
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for research, development, and production of vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and non-pharma-
ceutical interventions. Lastly, we recommend that the private sector become formal participants in 
discussions and planning for pandemic preparedness and response.
D: PROVIDING ADEQUATE FINANCE
8. Continued Funding for Disease Detection & Prevention Programs
Our final topic area for this white paper is the importance of programs designed to detect and pre-
vent disease outbreaks from becoming epidemics and pandemics. These types of programs include 
those funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of 
Defense (DOD), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Our recommendation 
in this area is simple: the United States should continue to support international disease detection 
and prevention and give priority to innovative and advanced research programs that employ a One 
Health approach in order to prevent animal-to-human spillover events. These are critical invest-
ments for international health security and pandemic preparedness. 
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Pandemics remain a central international health security challenge. Emerging diseases, fluctuations 
in climate, global interconnectedness—both physically and economically—and greater interaction 
between animals and people, especially in the developing world, are just a few of the reasons that 
the international community should be more concerned about pandemics than ever. While we pri-
oritize nuclear and military threats to our national security, we easily forget the power of plagues in 
history and it is important that we accept and prepare for pandemics for it is not a matter of if; it is 
a matter of when. 
In October of 2017, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at The Bush School of Govern-
ment & Public Service at Texas A&M University held its Third Annual Global Pandemic Policy Summit 
in College Station, Texas to discuss some of the most daunting challenges facing pandemic pre-
vention, detection, and response. This White Paper draws from and expands on conversations that 
took place during the two-day summit and proposes solutions for some of the biggest challenges. 
While there are numerous unresolved issues in pandemic preparedness and response, we chose to 
address eight that we think are most pressing. These include: 1) best practices in management of 
animal disease; 2) ensuring community-level awareness and action; 3) increasing continuity in sup-
INTRODUCTION
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ply chains; 4) targeting antimicrobial resistance; 5) strengthening leadership and coordination; 6) 
maintaining United States involvement in pandemic preparedness and international health security; 
7) ensuring that the private sector is fully involved; and 8) continuing funding for disease detection 
and prevention programs.
The international community should address all of the eight areas listed above to strengthen the 
ability of individual countries and the international community to respond to outbreaks of infec-
tious disease. Additionally, as we stress throughout this White Paper, the United States should 
remain involved in and committed to leadership and assistance in pandemic preparedness and 
response and international health security more broadly. As one of the largest contributors, in 
terms of economic, man-power, and technological contributions to global health security, American 
withdrawal from the world stage on this issue would be devastating to the ability to prevent disease 
outbreaks. Withdrawal would also threaten the well-being of the American people because disease 
does not respect national borders. 
While some of the areas addressed in this White Paper overlap, each represents an important, in-
dependent area of prevention, detection, and response to pandemics. They are gaps in the system 
that the international community should remain committed to filling.
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BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT OF ANIMAL DISEASE 
Culling, or the practice of slaughtering animals to reduce population or control disease, has always 
been a central part of disease control strategy within livestock and wildlife populations. The goal 
of this practice is to destroy a population of potentially infected animals so that the disease cannot 
spread. While it can sometimes be effective, culling is an expensive disease control policy. The most 
recent avian influenza scare occurred in 2015 and lead to the destruction of roughly 49.5 million 
chickens and turkeys in the United States, which is estimated to have an economic cost of $1.57 
billion (McKenna, 2015). That is just the direct cost of lost birds. If you examine the poultry industry 
as a whole—in losses in eggs, losses to food service firms, etc.—the total economic loss is closer to 
$3.3 billion (McKenna, 2015). 
For areas in which subsistence farming dominates, the practicing of culling as a method of disease 
control becomes problematic. First, there is concern that if people kill their food source to prevent 
TOPIC AREA 1
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the spread of disease, they will no longer have anything to eat. Secondly, there are often no guaran-
tees that the farmers will receive compensation if they cull their animals. This was seen in the early-
to-mid 2000s when farmers in Nigeria had trouble receiving compensation for preemptive culling, 
because the country was experiencing cash flow problems (Kanamori & Jimba, 2007). 
Compensation
Culling livestock can create financial, psychological, and logistical issues. In order to minimize these 
potential problems, governments are strongly encouraged to compensate producers for the an-
imals they cull. FAO lists seven reasons why all governments should implement compensation 
schemes. These reasons include: 1) it is the fair thing to do, 2) it is a powerful incentive for farmers 
to report sick animals and birds, 3) it helps safeguard public health, 4) it helps safeguard domestic 
trade, 5) it helps safeguard international trade, 6) it is good for a country’s international reputation, 
and 7) it encourages industry cooperation. 
As previously mentioned, without incentive to report sick animals, producers are highly unlikely 
to do so. In fact, it is more likely that they will sell off the sick animals or kill them and eat them 
themselves (FAO, 2017). Thus, establishing a compensation scheme is important to encouraging 
producers to report sick animals that they may have. In turn, if producers are encouraged to report 
sick animals in a timely manner, countries will be able to protect public health, domestic, and inter-
national trade. If countries learn about a problem early on, they are able to take steps to eliminate 
the problem and therefore, maintain confidence with trade partners (FAO, 2017). Some countries 
may not have the financial means to compensate producers for culled animals. In these instances, 
the international community—using an established culling fund at WHO, FAO, the World Bank, and 
OIE—should help compensate farmers. 
Although there are many indirect costs that re-
sult from culling operations, only direct losses 
are compensated. The FAO suggests that com-
pensation schemes should be developed to pay 
fair market price for each animal that was culled 
(FAO, 2017). This compensation can extend to 
eggs and occasionally feed that must be de-
stroyed. In order to determine the fair market val-
ue of each animal, governments should establish 
a compensation rate that takes into account the 
animal’s age, sex, size, and health as well as the 
region the animal is produced in and the season 
in which the animal was culled (FAO, 2017). All of 
these elements can help governments determine 
the appropriate compensation rate for culled 
animals. 
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In the United Kingdom, most compensation is 
only applied to healthy animals that were culled 
as part of the disease containment process. An-
imals that were sick with the disease the culling 
was targeted at are typically not compensated. 
The United Kingdom government puts animals 
into compensation categories based on a number 
of factors. For cattle, these factors include: age, 
sex, pedigree status, and type (beef or dairy) (De-
partment for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 
2014). Obviously, animals with higher pedigree 
status receive more compensation than animals 
with lower status. With regards to birds, deter-
mining compensation value means examining 
the bird’s species, age, sex, what it was farmed 
for (meat or eggs), the cost of raising the birds, 
and any income that is derived from them (De-
partment for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, 
2014). There is much greater variation in com-
pensation rates for bird populations than there is 
for cattle populations. 
The United Kingdom is just one example of a government compensation scheme. While it sets out 
guidelines to make sure that producers are compensated for culled animals, it does have flaws. 
First, producers are generally not compensated for sick animals. This may encourage a lack of trans-
parency on the part of the producer because they will likely want to be compensated for all animals 
that are culled. Uniform culling compensation, meaning that producers are compensated for all 
animals that are killed as part of the government culling procedure, would serve to reduce some of 
this risk and increase transparency on the part of producers. 
Problems with Compensation Inequality
Compensating producers for animals that are culled as part of a government program to prevent 
disease spread is important to ensuring open and honest communication, transparency, and the 
greatest effectiveness in disease containment. However, if compensation is promised to produc-
ers as part of their participation, the government should provide this compensation. As mentioned 
earlier, it will likely be more difficult to get subsistence farmers to participate in government culling 
programs because if they do not receive compensation or it does not come in  a timely manner, 
they will have no animals to eat and no way to purchase food.
Recently, poultry producers in South Africa began to question whether they would truly be compen-
sated for the large economic losses they suffered due to culling (Omarjee, 2017). More than three 
months after culling occurred, producers still had not been compensated. Failure to deliver on 
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promised compensation undermines the process 
and creates an environment in which producers 
are unlikely to trust government officials and will 
be less likely to participate (transparently, anyway) 
in government culling programs. 
A 2006 standoff occurred between Israeli poul-
try farmers and the Agriculture Ministry over the 
issue of compensation. Producers went as far as to 
block inspectors and veterinarians from entering 
until they had guarantees from the government 
that they would be compensated for their losses 
(Cohen, 2006). The disagreement centered around 
compensation for indirect losses. The government 
does guarantee producers will be compensated for 
direct losses (i.e. dead birds), but they will not be 
compensated beyond that. Producers argue that 
there are numerous indirect losses that come from 
culling and should be compensated for those loss-
es as well. Thus, problems with compensation do not just come from problems with governments 
not paying promised compensation, but also with a narrow focus on only compensating producers 
for direct costs. 
Lastly, in cases where compensation is not forthcoming from the government, it can be easier for 
larger companies to get the compensation they are owed. Larger companies often have the finan-
cial capability to push the government to issue compensation that they are owed for culling ani-
mals under government order. Small farmers may not have these same means. Therefore, when 
compensation is not forthcoming, it is often the small farmers—who are likely suffering the most 
economically from the culling—who are unable to get the compensation that is owed to them. This 
further compounds the economic problems they are facing and in turn, makes it less likely that they 
will openly cooperate in the future. 
Recommendations
1. Each country should have written compensation guidelines.
Although many countries have written procedures for culling compensation, it is not universal. In 
order to create a more transparent and fixed compensation system, every country that uses cull-
ing as a disease control strategy should have written guidelines for compensation. This serves as a 
contract with producers and provides a level of security for them as they move forward with culling 
their flocks and herds. While this does not solve issues of compensation payments not being made, 
it takes the first step in establishing a commitment to compensate producers for their economic 
losses. 
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2. Governments should be held accountable for not providing promised compensation.
As the above discussion demonstrates, occasionally a government promises to compensate pro-
ducers and does not follow through on that promise. Governments that do not follow through with 
compensation payments should be held accountable. When governments do not provide compen-
sation that is promised to producers, they are not only putting producers at economic risk but are 
also putting their country and the rest of the world at risk for zoonotic and other transboundary 
animal diseases, decreasing the likelihood that producers will cooperate in the future and may even 
hide outbreaks within their flocks or herds. OIE, FAO, and WHO should establish a mechanism that 
can be used to punish governments that do not provide promised compensation. This mechanism 
could come in the form of reduced funding or assistance, or it could be public reprimand, such as 
publishing the names of countries that fail in this regard. 
3. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of 
the United Nations, and the World Health Organization (WHO) should establish a culling compen-
sation fund.
Some countries do not have programs to compensate producers when government culling occurs, 
and some countries may not even attempt culling as a disease control strategy due to a lack of 
resources. To help in these cases, the OIE, FAO, and WHO should come together to form a culling 
compensation fund. This fund would be supported by contributions from member states, multina-
tional organizations, and the private sector and would help provide compensation to countries who 
do not have the financial resources to offer it. 
4. Options other than culling should be explored.
While culling is currently the main method used for disease control in livestock, it does not have to 
be the only method. Not only are there problems with compensation and substantial industry-wide 
economic losses that accompany culling, but many question whether it is a humane practice. 
Should millions of animals be slaughtered when a handful are found to be infected? The United 
States and other countries should begin developing disease control strategies other than culling. 
The development of vaccines or treat-
ment options once an animal is infect-
ed are both viable alternatives to the 
current system. To date, investments 
in animal vaccines, diagnostics, and 
other animal disease control strategies 
have been insignificant compared to 
similar investments for public health 
preparedness. Countries should adopt 
a One Health approach to this prob-
lem and begin investing in alternative 
animal disease control strategies.
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TOPIC AREA 2
ENSURING COMMUNITY-LEVEL AWARENESS & ACTION 
Building Local Capacities
Often times, conversations of pandemic preparedness and response take place without the inclu-
sion of the countries that are most likely to be affected by these outbreaks. Through the Interna-
tional Health Regulations (IHR), many WHO member states have taken steps to build local capabil-
ities and resilience, but this has not gone far enough. “The lack of capacity in Guinea to detect the 
virus for several months was a key failure, allowing Ebola eventually to spread to bordering Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. This phase underscored the problem of inadequate investment in health infra-
structure, despite national governments’ formal commitments to do so under the International 
Health Regulations (2005) and awareness among donors that many lower income countries would 
need substantial external support” (Moon et al, 2015, p. 2206). 
The challenges of building local capacities and resilience were starkly demonstrated during the 
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2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. As Sands et al. (2016) explains, “Identifying the outbreak in the 
community and raising alerts took too long. Local health systems were quickly overwhelmed. Re-
sponse teams did not adequately engage communities and deepened distrust in health authorities” 
(p. 1281). If local communities are not prepared and do not have the capabilities to respond quickly 
and efficiently, outbreaks can become pandemics. 
During any outbreak, the local community and the local public health capabilities of the affected 
country are the first line of defense. If disease outbreaks can be contained at the source before 
they are given an opportunity to cross national borders, regional epidemics or pandemics may be 
prevented from occurring in the first place. But this local source containment cannot be done with-
out prioritizing community engagement, funding local and national capacities, and facilitating rapid 
response. Moon et al. (2015) argues that “all countries need a minimum level of core capability to 
detect, report, and respond rapidly to outbreaks” (p. 2204). In order to create this minimum capabil-
ity, developed countries, in combination with WHO, need to create a strategy for helping countries 
develop health capacity.
In order to detect and quickly respond to disease outbreaks, developing countries, particularly 
those at the greatest risk for such outbreaks, need sustained investment in health infrastructure. 
While sustained investment is a challenge in many developed countries, it can seem almost impos-
sible in developing countries, especially those experiencing conflict. Conflict often creates a lack of 
access to health services either because health facilities have been destroyed or because conflict 
prevents people from being able to travel for medical care (Kimrough et al., 2012). Sometimes, 
health infrastructure can be deliberately destroyed, and medical staff targeted, as is the case with 
Yemen in 2017 (Venters, 2017). 
There have been ongoing attempts over 
the last several decades to strengthen local 
capacities. One notable project was the US-
AID-funded Data for Decision-Making Project 
(DDM). This project was implemented from 
1991-1996 and focused on using data to in-
form decisions. The program operated in the 
countries of Bolivia, Cameroon, Mexico, and 
the Philippines (Pappaioanou et al., 2003). In 
these four countries, the program was able to 
help build health capacities through training 
programs in communication, management, 
epidemiology, and economics (Pappaioanou 
et al, 2003). It also helped develop and im-
plement community health plans. In Camer-
oon in particular, the programs focused on 
strengthening epidemic preparedness (Pap-
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paioanou et al, 2003). This is one example of a program designed to increase local capacities, but, 
like DDM, they are often not a sustained effort. 
Encouraging Reporting
In addition to building capabilities of local communities to prepare for and respond to disease out-
breaks, there is another problem area that receives little attention: reporting. If a country does have 
the ability to detect an outbreak of disease and it meets the requirements for a reportable disease 
under the IHR, they then must report it to the WHO. Unfortunately, there are often strong disincen-
tives to report disease. Although it was pre-IHR, the impact of suppressing disease information was 
demonstrated by the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. If a country is fear-
ful that reporting a disease will have economic repercussions, they are unlikely to feel compelled to 
report it in a timely manner. 
Risks of a Community-Level Approach
While a community-level approach has the potential for significant positive outcomes, it is not with-
out risks. Reliance on NGOs is likely to create some level of hostility among the host country govern-
ment. Hostility toward NGOs from host country governments typically stems from a perceived chal-
lenge to the sovereignty of the state and is not a new problem. It could pose challenges, however, 
to the effective implementation of community-level interventions. Additionally, public universities 
in developing countries are not always independent, unbiased entities. Often times they serve as 
a part of the broader clientelist system, which may mute their role in establishing community-level 
resilience.
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Recommendations 
5. International NGOs and local universities should serve as a main component for
local capacity building.
International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local universities are often in a unique 
position in communities. Typically, they have established deep relationships with a village or town 
within which they work and are in a prime position to help with local capacity building, particularly 
with regards to knowledge development. International NGOs are also uniquely positioned because 
of their larger, streamlined structure. They are often able to develop broader, more efficient pro-
grams than smaller, regional or local NGOs. 
NGOs and local universities should establish training and sustained educational programs for the 
local community. These programs should train physicians in what signs to look for when diagnosing 
infectious disease. They should train veterinarians, animal health paraprofessionals, and livestock 
producers in identifying and preventing spillover threats between animals and humans, and they 
should teach the lay public—families and individuals—about how to protect themselves from infec-
tion and when they should seek medical care. Creating more knowledge and understanding within 
all levels of the community could reduce the time it takes to detect, report, and respond to a dis-
ease outbreak.
6. There should be more international funding dedicated to building and maintaining
health infrastructure in developing countries.
The international community and national governments should invest in building and maintaining 
health infrastructure in countries that are at the greatest risk for disease outbreaks. This means in-
vesting in the health infrastructure of a country at every step along the way. The international com-
munity should invest in helping countries build hospitals and health clinics; biosecure public health 
and university-based laboratory diagnostic capabilities, biosurveillance, and reporting systems; 
supply health facilities with the medical and reagent supplies they need; encourage and support 
health professionals so that they have less incentive to leave and work in another country; help 
facilitate health clinics’ ability to reach populations in rural areas; and address any gaps identified by 
the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR and national planning process. Establishing stable, func-
tioning health—laboratory and reporting—infrastructure will increase the chances that disease can 
be contained at the source. However, the structure 
of funding and accountability should move away 
from a rule-based ideology to better meet the 
needs of relationship-based societies. The interna-
tional community and national governments need 
to develop programs that work within the clien-
telist structure of societies in developing countries. 
If these important structural differences continue 
to be ignored, it will be difficult to have a positive, 
long-term impact.
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INCREASING CONTINUITY IN SUPPLY CHAINS
The Threat of Supply Chain Disruption
Today, it is possible to travel across the world in 24 hours. People and goods can be transported 
to the farthest corners of the globe at speeds that were unimaginable a century ago. Not only can 
goods and people move rapidly, but they can move reliably. That is to say that if you are boarding 
an airplane or a company is placing a container on a cargo ship, there is an exceedingly high proba-
bility that, in both situations, the person or cargo will make it to the intended destination within the 
intended time frame. Innovations of transportation have made it possible for people to explore the 
world and have changed the structure of the global economy simultaneously. 
As speed and efficacy of trade movement increased, it was no longer economically advantageous 
for a country to produce all the goods and services that it needs. Rather, the idea of comparative 
advantage—meaning the ability of one country to carry out a particular economic activity more 
efficiently than another—took hold in the global economy and countries began to narrow and 
TOPIC AREA 3
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streamline production. With compara-
tive advantage, a country must weigh 
the opportunity costs of producing 
items they make less efficiently to 
determine if it is of economic benefit 
to keep producing them. Most times, 
the answer is no. These cost/benefit 
analyses have led to specialized econ-
omies and specialized production 
throughout the world. It’s a phenome-
non not only occurring with goods like 
food or cars but also pharmaceuticals 
and medical equipment. As Rodriguez, 
Luke, and Osterholm (2017) explain, 
“The global economy has been fa-
vored by the exploitation of compara-
tive advantage and a tighter manage-
ment of supply chains. Inventories are kept to a minimum. Virtually no production surge capacity 
exists. As a consequence, most markets depend on the timely delivery of many critical products 
(such as pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, food and equipment parts) and services (such as com-
munications support).” 
While this is economically beneficial, the new structure of our global economy increases the risk of 
catastrophe. It is important to note, however, that not all supply chains are created equal. A disrup-
tion in the automobile supply chain does not have the same impact as a disruption in the supply 
chain of insulin. Disruption in one means a shortage of cars on the market. A disruption in the other 
means a shortage or unavailability of vital insulin for diabetics. The supply chain disruptions we are 
focused on in this paper are ones like the latter. Ones that would create significant, life-threaten-
ing circumstances if they were disrupted by a pandemic. When the public—or government officials 
for that matter—think about pandemics, supply chains rarely come to mind. Instead, the focus of 
pandemic preparedness and response is centered on morbidity and mortality, as well as disease 
control measures. Possible supply chain disruptions rarely enter the conversation. But they should. 
Disruptions resulting from a pandemic could lead to increases in mortality, some of which would be 
preventable with the right supplies and equipment. To this point, in his 2017 book titled The Dead-
liest Enemy: Our War on Killer Germs, Osterholm explains that “virtually all of our generic lifesaving 
pharmaceuticals are manufactured overseas” (p. 63). In addition to overseas production of phar-
maceuticals, the majority of N95 masks, which are respiratory masks designed to filter out airborne 
particles, are made in China.
The impact of Hurricane Maria on the supply of small bag IV saline provides a glimpse into the 
potentially devastating effects of disruptions in critical supply chains. The hurricane knocked out 
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electricity to the island, which effectively shut down the three Baxter International plants located 
there. The IV saline bag shortage that followed meant that nurses in some hospitals had to admin-
ister drugs slowly through syringes, which is a time consuming and much more dangerous process 
(Sheridan, 2017). Other hospitals even resorted to the use of Gatorade for patient rehydration (Fox, 
2018). With the vast majority of our pharmaceuticals and medical supplies produced outside the 
United States, any disruption in the supply chain could have dramatic and deadly consequences 
during a pandemic. 
How Does Disruption Occur?
The most obvious way that pandemics impact supply chains is through absenteeism. Absenteeism 
refers to the rate at which employees are missing work either because of their own illness or be-
cause of the illness of a family member. During a pandemic it is inevitable that the rate of absen-
teeism in the workforce will rise. The impact, however, will depend on the ability of the company or 
sector to cope with the reduced workforce. 
A report from the National Infrastructure Advisory Council in 2007 found that 87% of health sector 
emergency service workers are deemed critical. This means that with an employee absentee rate 
of 13% or above, emergency services would begin to break down. In the transportation sector, the 
majority of supplies are transported via rail or truck. With an absenteeism rate of roughly 14%, the 
largest rail yards in the United States would begin to experience a backlog, resulting in noticeable 
delays (DHS, 2015). With regards to the trucking industry, its highly decentralized nature means that 
the majority of trucks are run by small companies. These companies are especially vulnerable to 
absenteeism and as few as five sick employees could halt the company’s operations entirely (DHS, 
2015). 
At any given time, there are roughly 60,000 large cargo ships transporting freight across the world 
(Osterholm, 2017). Additionally, aircrafts transport 9.54 million tons of freight globally every year 
(Osterholm, 2017). Components 
of our critical medical infra-
structure are almost always in 
transit. This danger is eloquent-
ly summed up by Osterholm 
(2017) as he explains, “Today, 
we live in a just-in-time-delivery 
economy where virtually noth-
ing is warehoused for future 
sales, let alone stockpiled for 
a crisis situation. Not even the 
parts and components nec-
essary to manufacture these 
critical supplies are warehoused 
and stockpiled. When a rolling 
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global pandemic takes its toll on the working population of a city in Asia, for example, the prod-
ucts and supplies that come from that city—and perhaps nowhere else—that we need to respond 
to a rapidly growing pandemic will not be available. No amount of money can buy something that 
doesn’t exist” (p. 53).
Recommendations
7. Understand our critical supply chains
Supply chains are complex and often operate in the shadows. Few people think about the pro-
cess that gets their food to the grocery store or, prior to Hurricane Maria, knew that almost half 
of America’s supply of small bag IV saline was produced in Puerto Rico. The majority of the time, 
these supply chains involve multiple countries and transportation methods. In circumstances where 
products are made in one country or location, it is important that the United States looks into ways 
to diversify production to reduce the risk of supply chain disruption. This diversification cannot take 
place, however, until we fully understand where our critical supplies are made. Analysis should be 
conducted to first determine which of our supply chains are critical and then outline all of the com-
ponents, choke points, and potential threats to those supply chains. Until there is identification of 
what our critical supply chains are and an understanding of how they operate, the United States will 
not be able to adequately prepare for potential disruptions.
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TARGETING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 
The Scale of the Problem
Antimicrobials, or agents that kill microorganisms, changed the course of human disease history. 
The discovery and development of antibiotics is arguably one of the great achievements in human 
history. Prior to the discovery of penicillin in 1928, even a small scratch could be life-threatening. 
Following the discovery of penicillin and the development of numerous other antibiotics, infections 
that used to be deadly became treatable. For decades, people around the world have used antibiot-
ics, and more recently antivirals, giving little thought to the genetic mutations occurring within the 
microscopic organisms. Today, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has become endemic in almost every 
country and, if not addressed, society could be heading back into a world where the smallest of 
scratches could be deadly. 
AMR is a result of the selective pressure placed on bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites due to 
their interaction with antimicrobials. As Ferri et al. (2017) describes, “AMR became an unavoidable 
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result of the fragile balance between bacteria and drugs with bacteria having infinitely more oppor-
tunities to gain resistance genes than humans have to create new antimicrobials…” (p. 2858). Ulti-
mately, the rise of AMR was inevitable, due in large part to bacteria’s ability to mutate more quickly 
than our ability to discover and develop new drugs to fight them. 
It is estimated that in the United States, approximately 2 million people annually are infected with 
an antimicrobial resistant bacterium. Of these cases, roughly 23,000 people die as a direct result of 
that infection (CDC, 2017). On a global scale, the numbers become even more alarming. It is esti-
mated that AMR is responsible for approximately 700,000 deaths worldwide every year (MacIntyre 
& Bui, 2017). Economically, in the European Union (EU) alone, costs associated with AMR are esti-
mated at €1.5 billion annually (WHO, 2015). These numbers are expected to grow if nothing is done 
to reverse the trend.
One of the greatest worldwide AMR problems is multi-drug resistant (MDR) tuberculosis (TB). Each 
year, there are approximately 450,000 new cases of MDR-TB, with 150,000 of those cases resulting 
in death (Cole, 2012). Microbes are winning the battles in humans, animals, and the environment. A 
study of the New York City subways showed that 27% of environmental samples (swabs of subway 
surfaces) contained AMR bacteria (Afshinneko et al., 2015; Ferri et al., 2017). The scale of this prob-
lem is vast and the implications are serious. 
What causes AMR?
There are a number of factors that have contributed to AMR, but the biggest and most important is 
the misuse and overuse of antibiotics. Over the years antibiotics have often been prescribed for vi-
ral infections or if a diagnosis is unknown. In many countries throughout the developing world, it is 
even possible to obtain antibiotics without a prescription (WHO, 2015). “Regulation of the use of an-
timicrobial agents is inadequate or poorly 
enforced in many areas, such as over-the-
counter and Internet sales. Related weak-
nesses that contribute to development of 
antimicrobial resistance include poor pa-
tient and health care provider compliance, 
the prevalence of substandard medicines 
for both human and veterinary use, and 
inappropriate or unregulated use of antimi-
crobial agents in agriculture” (WHO, 2015). 
The area that experiences the largest mis-
use or overuse of antibiotics is neonatal 
care (Cole, 2012). In this sector of human 
health, antibiotics are often given before a 
diagnosis is confirmed, which results in 95% 
overuse (Cole, 2012). Reducing overuse 
in neonatal care could not only help slow 
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AMR, but it could also save millions of dollars per year (Cole, 2012). 
The use of antimicrobials in agriculture is a particularly large problem. FAO (2016) estimates that in 
2010 the livestock sector used 63,151 tons of antibiotics. In fact, 80% of antimicrobials in the United 
States are used in food animals and 70% of these are used for non-therapeutic, i.e. not medically 
necessary, purposes (Ferri et al., 2017). Additionally, countries like Brazil, China, and South Africa 
have seen a 99% increase in their consumption of antimicrobials (Ferri et al., 2017). Unregulated 
use of antibiotics in the livestock sector is a global problem, though the EU and United States have 
taken steps to reduce non-therapeutic use. Because of the scale of antimicrobial use in livestock, 
the United Nations (UN) argues that a One Health approach is vital to combating AMR. 
Challenges Tracking AMR
While it has been determined that AMR is a problem in almost every country in the world, under-
standing the scope of the problem can be difficult. This is especially true in countries that lack ade-
quate surveillance. A meta-analysis conducted by Tadesse et al. (2017) found that AMR data is not 
available for over 40% of countries in Africa, and even when data is available, the quality of the data 
may be lacking. From available data, however, it is clear that there is greater resistance to antimi-
crobials commonly used and less resistance to antimicrobials that are less commonly used. Thus, 
use of antibiotics is creating antibiotic resistant organisms.
As WHO (2015) points out, “Information on: the incidence, prevalence, range across pathogens and 
geographical patterns related to antimicrobial resistance needs to be made accessible in a timely 
Deaths attributable to antimicrobial resistance every year by 2050
Figure 1. This figure shows the projected annual number of deaths from AMR by 2050.  
(Source: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 2014)
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manner in order to guide the treatment of patients; to inform local, national, and regional actions; 
and to monitor the effectiveness of interventions.” Even in local hospitals, near-real time AMR sur-
veillance is needed to take timely corrective actions, so other patients and health care workers are 
not unnecessarily exposed. 
This problem can become even more complicated when trying to track AMR in food production. 
It is well documented that large volumes of antibiotics used in livestock production leads to AMR 
agents in the environment (soil, etc.) and within the animals; what is less clear is if consumption of 
these animals leads to AMR in humans (Ferri et al, 2017). Proper cooking procedures should kill any 
bacteria, thus protecting humans from AMR transmission from food consumption, but bacterial 
persistence in the environment could lead to infection in humans. Additionally, in many parts of the 
developing world, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of AMR in livestock populations.
AMR presents a significant global health challenge. As more bacteria become resistant, society 
inches closer to a world without antibiotics. In 2012 Margaret Chan, the former Director-General 
of WHO, stated, “…post-antibiotic era means, in effect, the end of modern medicine as we know 
it. Things as common as strep throat or a child’s scratched knee could once again kill.” Although 
some may be tempted to dismiss Chan’s remarks as exaggerated, current statistics on AMR-related 
deaths demonstrate the growing extent of the problem. Without the development of new antimi-
crobials, a world without antibiotics will become a reality.
Recommendations
8. Increased investment in research, development, and production of new antimicrobials
Currently, microbes are developing resistance to antimicrobials faster than new drugs can be pro-
duced. This is partly because microbes have the advantage of short generation times, and partly 
because there is a lack of interest 
in developing new antimicrobials. 
Relative to other pharmaceuticals, 
the production of new antimicrobi-
als is not as economically attractive 
to companies (Ferri et al., 2017). 
Additionally, for any pharmaceutical, 
development and production are 
the two most expensive parts of the 
process. If companies cannot antic-
ipate sufficient profit margins, it is 
difficult to encourage them to spend 
the money to make the product. 
Although the WHO and the United 
States have begun to address AMR 
through the “Global Action Plan” 
on reducing AMR and “Combating 
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Antimicrobial Resistance National Strategy,” respectively, more should be done to provide sound 
strategies and innovative financing models. The international community should enable effective 
public-private partnerships to develop new antimicrobials and, simultaneously, foster effective an-
timicrobial stewardship. Unfortunately, without the development of new antimicrobials, society will 
soon find itself in the post-antibiotic world described by Margaret Chan. 
9. Create a stronger regulatory system for veterinary/farm use of antimicrobials
As discussed above, the use of antimicrobials in the livestock sector plays an important role in the 
rise of AMR. While countries like the United States and UK have taken steps to reduce non-thera-
peutic use in livestock, countries in the developing world are almost wholly unregulated. Compli-
cating matters further, some high-income exporting countries like China are the largest users of 
antimicrobials in livestock, and regulations are not strictly enforced (Ying et al., 2017). The practice 
of “rent-seeking”—bribery, extortion, and discretionary redistribution of government funds for 
unethical purposes—in many developing countries also inhibits the ability to establish regulatory 
practices. While regulation in some countries is extremely difficult, governments and professional 
organizations should work with the veterinary and livestock production communities to help them 
understand the appropriate use of antibiotics and train them to instruct farmers on appropriate 
use also. Understanding how farmers are currently using antibiotics and educating them on appro-
priate use is central to reducing AMR in the livestock sector. 
10. Decrease misuse and overuse of antimicrobials in human health
The livestock sector is not the only area experiencing overuse of antibiotics. Human medicine also 
has a problem with over-prescription or general misuse of antimicrobials. Both the medical com-
munity and the public should be educated on the appropriate use of antibiotics. With regards to 
neonatal care, standard of clinical care guidelines, institutional oversight protocols, and regulations 
should rapidly evolve, so that antibiotics are judiciously used until infection is confirmed by labo-
ratory tests. While 90% of antibiotics used in the neonatal setting are unnecessary, early admin-
istration of treatment can be lifesaving in the other 10% of cases. Because of the importance and 
necessity of early treatment in these cases, there must be innovation in real-time surveillance and 
improvements in rapid diagnostics for newborns. 
11. Understand that fighting AMR requires a One Health approach
AMR is a problem in humans, animals, and the environment. Addressing it in only one of these 
spheres is not sufficient to slow the development of resistance or mitigate the problem. The only 
way to have a real impact is to address all of the spheres at once through a One Health approach. 
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STRENGTHENING LEADERSHIP & COORDINATION
Our 2017 White Paper addressed the need to establish centralized leadership within the American 
preparedness and response enterprise. We extended our support for the idea put forth by the 
Blue-Ribbon Panel Study on Biodefense that authority should be centralized in the Vice President 
of the United States office, and that there should be clear lines of authority extending from there. 
While this remains a gap in America’s ability to prepare for and respond to pandemics, whether that 
is vested within the Vice President or another high-level White House authority, we are now broad-
ening the conversation to examine the need for strengthening international leadership and coordi-
nation. Most notably, there is a need for international organizations involved in pandemic response 
to develop a strategic direction, to understand the importance of communication during a crisis and 
develop steps and strategies to communicate effectively, and to create coordination between orga-
nizations and countries that are part of the preparedness and response effort. 
TOPIC AREA 5
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First, in order to create effective pandemic response, the international community should develop a 
strategic direction and solidify response leadership. The development of a strategic direction re-
quires all international organizations and national governments involved in response to develop a 
set of strategies, tactics, and values for pandemic response. Currently, the role of WHO in pandem-
ic preparedness and response focuses on supporting member states in implementing their own 
national-level capabilities during an outbreak and strengthening these capabilities during the times 
between outbreaks. The UN operates in a similar manner to “help national authorities implement 
programmes with strong national ownership and adequate resources” (United Nations, 2017). 
Institutions like the WHO and the UN are vital to creating a strategic direction for leadership in 
pandemic response. They should work in conjunction with FAO, OIE, and national governments to 
coordinate and mobilize response. Most importantly, it requires that well-respected institutions 
like these show national governments and the public what should be done when preparing for and 
responding to disease outbreaks and help to facilitate action when an outbreak occurs. A lack of 
strategic direction in leadership can lead to confused lines of authority and delayed response from 
international organizations and implementing NGOs. During the 2014 outbreak of Ebola, a lack of 
cultural understanding, insufficient medical equipment, supplies, and training, as well as confusion 
about which agency should lead the response, demonstrated the challenges of international re-
sponse when there is a lack of direction and coordination. 
Current international response would be even 
further complicated by the intentional release of 
infectious disease through an act of bioterrorism. 
With an act of bioterrorism, there is a clear ma-
licious or criminal element, but the disease con-
trol and containment response would be similar. 
Thus, looking at an act of bioterrorism as a com-
pletely separate incident can undermine the abil-
ity to respond to naturally occurring outbreaks. 
Instead of treating preparation, prevention and 
response for bioterrorism as a separate and dis-
tinct challenge, it should be treated the same as a 
natural disease outbreak response with the addi-
tional element of a criminal or state party investi-
gation with transparent reporting for attribution, 
requiring close coordination with host country 
law enforcement and security components during 
preparedness planning and response. 
In addition to the connection between naturally 
occurring disease and bioterrorism, the United 
States and the rest of the world must recognize 
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the new era of synthetic biology and dual use research of concern. This is an era marked by all the 
positive and negative implications of a technology like Clustered Regulatory Interspaced Palindrom-
ic Repeats (CRISPR), which can be used to edit the base pairs of genes. A disease created with the 
use of CRISPR, if it were to be released intentionally or accidentally, could create a completely differ-
ent scenario than a natural disease. These new pandemic and health security challenges should be 
accounted for when developing response plans. 
In conjunction with a strategic direction, international organizations need to establish a communi-
cation strategy, using one individual as the crisis spokesperson, to help mitigate and contain fear 
during an outbreak. When facing a crisis, people develop their perception of the risk they are facing 
based on a number of factors. These factors include: past experience (Elder et al., 2007), feelings of 
control over the situation (Smith, 2006), and familiarity with the agent causing the crisis (Brug, Aro, 
Richardus, 2009). Thus, if people are faced with a disease they have no past experience with, feel 
powerless to protect themselves from, and have no knowledge or understanding of, it is a recipe for 
rampant and potentially destructive fear. Conversely, if it is a disease people have experience with 
and the last outbreak was mild or they feel that they have a limited chance of catching the disease, 
it will be difficult to motivate people to take action to protect themselves. In both of these scenari-
os, a communication strategy and an effective spokesperson are vital to leading and coordinating 
response.
As Peter Sandman (1993), one of the leading 
scholars in risk and crisis communication argues, 
there are two important parts to risk communi-
cation: scaring people and calming them down. 
Which one of these strategies international or-
ganizations will need to use during a pandemic 
will depend on the disease and risks, but most 
likely, they will be working to calm people down. 
It is the role of the spokesperson to build trust 
between themselves, the organization they rep-
resent, and the public. Information about the 
outbreak and how people can protect themselves 
should be communicated in a clear and timely 
manner. Having information about how the out-
break is progressing, setting realistic expectations 
that information will evolve until the outbreak is 
contained, and actions that can be taken to pro-
tect themselves will help to alleviate some of the 
fear surrounding the outbreak. 
A realistic challenge to creating good leadership, 
however, is governmental corruption and lack 
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of public trust in many developing countries. Because of widespread governmental corruption, 
many citizens of developing countries do not trust government officials and will not be receptive to 
communication coming from these individuals. For this reason, it is important to include religious 
leaders, tribal leaders, and traditional healthcare practitioners in message dissemination. If these 
groups of individuals can be encouraged to spread the message, it is more likely that the public will 
listen and respond accordingly. 
Defining Good Leadership
The following characteristics should be present in order for leadership to be qualified as good: 1) 
clear lines of authority and responsibility; 2) responsibility and authority to compel on-the-ground 
action; 3) an absence of responsibility without authority; 4) ability to bring multiple groups together 
in collaborative effort; 5) clear and consistent communication with the public; and 6) clear and con-
sistent two-way communication between organizations, agencies, and governments participating in 
response. 
The first three characteristics of good leadership, all refer to establishing responsibility and author-
ity. Clear lines of responsibility and authority are vital to any effective response. If agencies, organi-
zations, and governments do not understand their roles and who they report to, it will be difficult 
for them to mount the kind of response needed to control an outbreak of infectious disease. Each 
member of the response team should know their responsibility for the response effort and have 
the authority to carry it out; thus, they should have the ability to compel action on the ground. 
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Lastly, and arguably most important, individuals cannot be given responsibility for response without 
also being given the authority and resources to carry out those responsibilities. 
Good leadership also requires clear and consistent communication with the public. During a crisis, 
it is important to keep the public appraised of the situation. If the public hears different messages 
from different groups—or even from two people within the same organization—it is going to erode 
trust in leadership. Clear and consistent two-way communication between all the organizations 
involved in response is extremely important to good leadership but particularly important for good 
coordination. All agencies, organizations, and governments involved in response should be able 
to maintain open lines of communication throughout the response. This is important to problem 
solving any challenges that arise, keeping supply chains open and running efficiently, and coordinat-
ing the general logistics of a large response. Without all the characteristics discussed above, it is not 
possible to have a proper and effective response. 
Recommendations
12. Create a Strategic Direction for Leadership
Our first recommendation is for the international community to establish a tiered set of response 
framework and plans, outlining the strategic direction for leadership during pandemics. Plans 
should outline the following: 1) the lead agency and their responsibilities; 2) supporting agencies 
and organizations, responsibilities, and triggers for supporting agencies to surge quickly when re-
sponse needs go beyond public health; 3) roles of the national and local governments and all imple-
menting NGOs; and 4) where resources will come from to support the response.
Tiered response plans should encompass not only member state governments but also multina-
tional organizations. The plans should identify collaboration and integration points tiered from mul-
tinational and regional organizations to national and local governments. WHO, FAO, and OIE should 
continue to update preparedness plans and provide public health, animal health, and regulatory 
guidance, but they should also establish trigger points for supporting agency activation. Trigger 
points are important for an effective, whole-of-society response. 
Similar to a previous recommendation from the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, we call 
for the United States to establish an international response framework analogous to the national 
response framework for domestic disaster response. This international response framework should 
clearly identify USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) as the lead for the international 
response to epidemics and pandemics requiring United States government interagency involve-
ment and coordination. 
Additionally, the response framework should specifically address bioterrorism, biowarfare, and 
accidental release of biological agents. A section detailing the threats posed by dual use research 
of concern and diseases produced from synthetic biology should also be included. Areas of the 
response plan addressing intentional use of biological agents should support United Nations Res-
olution 1540 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Although the public health 
response may be similar, the framing of intentional use is different and will require close coordina-
Strengthening Leadership & Coordination
Global Leadership at a Crossroads
36
Strengthening Leadership & Coordination
tion with  law enforcement and security authorities during preparedness planning and response. 
The United States should lead diplomatic efforts with strategic international partners and member 
states of the United Nations Security Council. It is important to remind member states of their obli-
gations under BWC and require the timely and transparent initiation of outbreak investigations and 
reporting. WHO, FAO, OIE, and UN member states should serve as supporting agencies in response 
efforts.
13. Develop Communication Strategy
Proper communication plays an important role in mitigating irrational fear, instructing people on 
what actions to take to protect themselves and their families, and maintaining continuity of op-
erations. Each organization that is involved in pandemic response should develop a plan for their 
internal communication. Additionally, WHO should develop an effective strategy for communication 
between agencies, organizations, regions, and governments and with the public. Having this overar-
ching strategy will help to decrease confusion and minimize any unnecessary panic. 
14. Maintain United States Involvement
Our final recommendation for strengthening leadership and coordination is that the United States 
should remain involved. The United States has a great deal of infrastructure, expertise, and capabil-
ities that are important to creating effective response. If the United States does not remain engaged 
with the international community, it will be more difficult to mount an effective and timely re-
sponse. Diseases do not respect borders. If the next pandemic is caused by influenza, or something 
similar, it will be impossible for the United States to keep the disease out. The more the United 
States does to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks with pandemic potential internationally, 
the more time the response enterprise will have to implement domestic preparedness plans for the 
inevitable spread to the United States.
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MAINTAINING UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN PANDEMIC 
PREPAREDNESS & GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 
Pandemics are a Global Problem 
Pandemics, as the name implies, are a global problem. Disease is a microscopic enemy that can 
travel around the world inside human bodies before there are any outward signs of trouble. Dis-
eases can travel by car, rail, ship, airplane, or foot. It can travel with passengers or it can travel with 
cargo. 
Even when complete border shutdown does not occur, pandemics can have a large global economic 
impact. During the Ebola outbreak, the impact on Guinea’s GDP was estimated to be a 1% decrease 
(Hamilton, 2014). This is due in part to disruption in the tourism industry, but also because the bor-
der closures in West Africa had a negative impact on trade. Additionally, it is estimated that Toronto 
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lost $1 billion as a result of the SARS outbreak, and this is without a large disruption in goods trade 
(CBC News, 2003). The important takeaway from these examples is that disease has a significant 
economic impact and this impact will only be exacerbated by closing borders. 
Preparing the International System for Response
The international community should ensure that the international system is willing and able to re-
spond to disease outbreaks throughout the world. Pandemic preparation and response cannot fall 
by the wayside during the time between pandemics. Each country should be aware of its response 
capabilities, who will serve in response leadership roles, and which entities from the national gov-
ernment will work with international organizations like WHO and the UN. Understanding these 
elements requires consistent and meaningful discussion, financial commitment, and training. All 
players in the international system have an obligation to know where they fit into response and to 
be prepared.
Strengthening the Global Health Security Agenda
The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) was launched by the United States in 2014 as a five-year 
initiative to increase global preparedness and response capabilities for infectious disease out-
breaks. The GHSA has the goal of making the world safe and secure from infectious diseases of any 
cause (natural, accidental, and intentional). The GHSA is implemented through 11 action packages 
to improve capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks. Importantly, the GHSA goes 
beyond traditional public health to include animal health and biosecurity, antimicrobial resistance, 
mitigating zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans, creating emergency operations cen-
ters, laboratory biosafety/biosecurity, and a requirement to work with law enforcement. 
To date, the United States has been the 
largest contributor to the initiative, but 
other countries are also making sig-
nificant contributions. However, with 
only one year left before coming to the 
end of the five-year milestone, there is 
no sign that the Trump Administration 
plans to renew the initiative. The for-
mer Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Tom Price, announced 
to the World Health Assembly in May 
2017 that the United States remains 
committed to GHSA, but many are con-
cerned GHSA will not survive without 
significant United States involvement 
and support (Nuzzo, Ciero, & Ingles-
by, 2017). Some argue that GHSA can 
only work in stable, middle-income 
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countries because failed states or countries going through massive shocks, such as famine will not 
have the motivation or ability to conduct the Joint External Evaluation assessments (JEE). While this 
is true, GHSA has increased the ability to identify specific gaps in the diseases preparedness system 
with a goal to target available resources and demonstrate accountability to donors. This is the next 
step in the right direction…. 
Recommendations
15. Change the way infectious disease problems are framed
Understanding the potential impact of a pandemic can be difficult and the impact can vary based 
on the assessment measurement used (morbidity, mortality, economic impact, adjusted disability 
life years, etc). Despite recent outbreaks, it continues to be difficult to convince people and govern-
ments to invest in preparing for the next pandemic. The international community needs to reframe 
the conversation from something that might happen to something that will happen with catastroph-
ic economic impacts that could erode regional stability and international security. Additionally, com-
bining the conversation of bioterrorism and potential negative impacts of synthetic biology with the 
conversation about pandemic preparedness and response could help to encourage investment.
16. Increase international response capacity
In line with changing the way problems are framed is increasing international response capacity. As 
the 2014 Ebola, 2016 Zika, and the ongoing plague outbreak in Madagascar demonstrate, large in-
fectious disease outbreaks requiring international support are becoming more common. WHO has 
made progress in addressing Ebola after-action findings, to improve their ability to support member 
states, and to scale up their own capabilities to react more quickly to disease outbreaks. However, 
continual evaluation of response effectiveness, quality, and ability to effectively work with regional 
WHO organizations is important to make sure that these abilities are fully established, resourced, 
and sustained. 
All countries, including but not limited to the United States, should continue to make financial 
contributions to international health security that increase the capacity of vital organizations to 
respond to international disease emergencies. Member states should establish a reserve public 
health corps that can provide personnel surge capacity. Emergency funds should be readily avail-
able for all response needs. Delays in response because WHO, responding member states, and the 
United States response teams do not have access to funds coupled to a functioning international 
response framework could be the difference between containing an outbreak at its source and a 
pandemic.
Maintaining Involvement in Preparedness & Security
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ENSURING THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS FULLY INVOLVED 
The challenge of preparing for and responding to pandemics remains a significant international 
health challenge. Despite the obvious need, the world is at a crossroads with some large country 
contributors—notably the United States—seeking to decrease investment in global health. There is 
also a problem of discrepancies between the amount of investment pledged by a country and the 
amount that is actually given. As government contributions decrease, it is important that private 
industry helps fill the gap. Currently, around $160 billion is spent on health research and develop-
ment (R&D) annually (Schneider, Villasenor, & West, 2017). The majority of this R&D is focused on 
the developing world, though neglected diseases receive the least amount of funding from private 
investors (Schneider, Villasensor, & West, 2017). Additionally, pharmaceutical companies serve as 
the major investors, with non-Western companies, notably those from China and India, providing 
substantial increases in investments. 
TOPIC AREA 7
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While $160 billion may seem like a large number, it is not nearly sufficient enough to prepare for 
the threat of a pandemic. Approximately 50% of that funding goes to research on HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis, and malaria (Schneider, Villasensor, & West, 2017) and there is virtually no interest in fund-
ing R&D in emerging or potentially pandemic diseases. This lack of investment is particularly trou-
bling at a time when the United States is significantly decreasing their commitment to global health. 
In the FY2017-2018 Appropriations request, there was an 18% decrease in the amount requested 
for HIV, 100% decrease in funding for Family Planning/Rural Health, 17% decrease for the Global 
Health Fund, and a 12% decrease in funding for Global Health Security (Kaiser Foundation, 2017). 
Importantly, the FY2017-2018 request shows a cut in every sector of global health ranging from 14% 
to 100% (Kaiser Foundation, 2017).
The large-scale cuts seen in the FY2017-2018 request reflect a significant challenge for pandemic 
preparedness and response. If funding is not available to prepare for and respond to outbreaks, it 
will be impossible to protect the world from a major disease outbreak. This is why private industry 
involvement is increasingly important. Funding needs for pandemic preparedness and response are 
not currently being met and the gaps and challenges will become worse as governments decrease 
funding. 
Most companies take on substantial financial risk to contribute to pandemic preparedness, which is 
why they do not tend to make these investments. Take vaccine development as an example: Vac-
cines are expensive and time consuming to produce. This is particularly true when talking about 
new vaccines. As a concept paper from Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) ex-
plains, “High fixed costs and steep learning 
curve make new vaccines relatively more 
expensive, as the investments in R&D and 
production facilities need to be paid off and 
optimum production techniques need to be 
perfected to bring down variable production 
costs.” The average total cost to develop a 
vaccine is estimated to be between $200 
million and $500 million (Serdobova & Kieny, 
2006). 
Further complicating the problem is that 
there is no market for the products (e.g., vac-
cines, antivirals, etc.) if there is no pandemic. 
This means spending large sums of money 
to create a pharmaceutical intervention that 
will likely never offer a chance for economic 
profit. Because of this, the incentive struc-
ture needs to change if private companies 
are to invest their resources in global health. 
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In addition to pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that have an obvious role in pandemic 
preparedness, almost all companies should have plans for their own continuity of operations and 
to protect their employees and support their communities in the event of an epidemic or pandem-
ic. Some multinational corporations, particularly those in energy exploration and extraction have 
operations in geographic infectious disease hot spots and are leading by example through good 
corporate citizenship. Their continuity of operation plans are not only in place to protect their own 
employees, but they also support health security institutional capacity building in host countries. 
Resilient communities in disease hot spots are essential to international health security. 
Recommendations
17. Greater economic investment from governments—not just the United States—in research,  
development, and production of vaccines, antivirals, therapeutics, and other pharmaceutical  
interventions
The cost of developing new vaccines and treatments are extremely high. Direct cost, opportunity 
costs, regulatory hurdles, technical challenges, and legal risks are barriers to companies developing 
vaccines and treatments for diseases with pandemic potential, because they may never earn a prof-
it—or even break-even—from their product investments. In order to offset some of the direct and 
opportunity costs, governments should contribute economically and establish effective policies to 
incentivize private sector investment. United States government acquisition and contracting mech-
anisms should account for pharmaceutical and biotechnology business best practices and optimize 
use of transaction authorities from Congress. Congress and the Executive Branch should also pro-
vide multi-year appropriations and clear execution plans, similar to the original Project Bioshield Act 
of 2004. While not covering the majority of costs, it would help to offset some financial risk compa-
nies take on during development, production, and licensure, and it would also signal to the private 
sector that the United States and international community are truly interested in and committed to 
the development of pandemic countermeasure products. 
18. Private industry should have a seat at the table.
The challenge faced by the international community with regards to pandemic preparedness, detec-
tion, and response is larger than any one country can handle, and the United States can no longer 
afford to be the only country with significant appropriations for biodefense and pandemic medical 
countermeasures development and procurement. The United States is not the Strategic National 
Medical Stockpile for the international community. Vaccines and pharmaceuticals are high cost and 
high-risk investments. As government contributions decrease, the gap needs to be filled by the pri-
vate sector and philanthropic donors. However, if the private sector is going to commit its resources 
to pandemic preparedness and response, they should be given a seat at the table and incentivized 
to participate in requirement setting, financing, regulatory, and contracting policies. Providing the 
private sector with a role throughout the process will help grow confidence and alleviate concerns 
about risks associated with public/private partnerships. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness 
Innovation (CEPI) is a step in the right direction and should be supported by donor governments 
and philanthropic investors.
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CONTINUING FUNDING FOR DISEASE DETECTION  
& PREVENTION PROGRAMS
What is the importance of disease detection and prevention programs?
There are a handful of major United States funded disease detection and prevention programs 
currently operating internationally. They include the CDC Global Disease Detection (GDD) Program, 
USAID Emerging Pandemic Threats (EPT) Program, Department of State Biological Engagement Pro-
gram, and the DOD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Cooperative Biological Engagement 
(CBEP) Programs. Along with the CDC GDD that maintains international laboratories for early warn-
ing, DOD also operates long-standing Army and Navy overseas research laboratories that provide 
unique laboratory and biosurveillance capabilities in host countries and surrounding regions, facil-
itating international collaboration and protection of deployed United States service members and 
allies. 
TOPIC AREA 8
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PREDICT is just one program within the Emerging Pandemic Threats (EPT) program at USAID. Over-
all, the EPT program focuses on various ways to strengthen disease prevention, detection, and 
response capabilities in developing countries, through their PREDICT, PREVENT, IDENTIFY, and RE-
SPOND programs. 
Out of the four EPT programs, however, only PREDICT is focused on identifying deadly diseases be-
fore they spillover into the human population. DOD’s Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) 
announced a new initiative to prevent spillover of emerging pathogenic threats — PREEMPT — us-
ing innovative systems biology approaches to enable near-real time surveillance and interventions 
in high risk countries, and CBEP is placing more emphasis on establishing laboratory institutional 
capacities in priority, high-risk countries.
PREDICT currently works in 30 countries, using the One Health approach and minimizing pandemic 
risk through a number of areas. These areas are: surveillance, laboratory platform, behavioral risk, 
capacity strengthening, modeling and analytics, and information management (UC Davis, 2017). 
As a follow on to PREDICT, the Global Virome Project (GVP) has been proposed by USAID and other 
NGOs. The proposed project is a 10-year public/private consortium with the goal to identify un-
known viruses from around the world. By 
attempting to identify and categorize viruses 
from around the world, the GVP is working 
to determine what viral threats the world is 
facing before they cause a major pandemic. 
The goal of the program is not only to identify 
unknown viruses, but also host ranges and 
behaviors that lead to spillover. 
The GVP anticipates six key benefits from the 
program. The first is that the project will char-
acterize the geographic scope and host range 
of viruses. Through the work of the project 
scientists will have a better understanding of 
reservoirs and transmission dynamics. The 
second key benefit is that GVP can identify 
behaviors that cause spillover and implement 
mitigation strategies. Third, the project can 
monitor the movement of viruses across re-
gions. Fourth, the project will allow countries 
and international organizations to establish 
global surveillance networks and strengthen 
local disease surveillance capacity. Lastly, 
the GVP is expected to identify “transmission 
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and pathogenicity markers” for viruses considered high risk and help establish legal and regulatory 
framework for sharing this data. 
While USAID and DOD are supporting the most innovative disease detection and prevention pro-
grams as envisioned by the National Strategy for Biosurveillance, there is a need for additional inno-
vation, high-risk host country institutional capacity building, and resources focused on identifying 
potentially deadly diseases before they spillover into the human population. The vast majority of 
emerging diseases are of zoonotic origin and often experience contact with humans on several oc-
casions before they are able to make the jump to human-to-human transmission, requiring a One 
Health approach. Identifying these viruses and mitigating the risk they pose to the human popula-
tion is vitally important to pandemic preparedness and global health security into the future. 
Recommendations
19. Continue funding for innovative biosurveillance, detection, and prevention programs. 
Our recommendation is simple: continue funding innovative infectious disease detection and pre-
vention programs along with risk-based investments in host country institutional capacities to real-
ize near-time biosurveillance and situational awareness as envisioned in the National Strategy for 
Biosurveillance. This is vital to enable rapid response and focused preparedness investments. These 
programs are countries’ first line of defense against the next pandemic. If scientists can identify dis-
eases before they reach the human population, millions of lives may be saved. But these programs 
cannot operate without funding commitments from the United States government. The United 
States should make these programs a priority. 
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When scientists, policy-makers, and the lay public alike ask the question: “Are we ready for the next 
pandemic?” the answer is always a qualified “No.” No, the world is not ready for the next pandemic, 
as demonstrated by large-scale disease outbreaks over the last decade, but countries are getting 
closer. But, countries’ is getting closer. The work of scientists and policy-makers concerned with 
infectious disease outbreaks have helped develop new ways to monitor, detect, and respond to dis-
ease. The international community has worked hard to learn from the mistakes of past responses 
and correct them. 
Despite these improvements, there is still a long way to go before the international community is 
able to say, “Yes, we are prepared.” This White Paper examines several areas that we believe are vi-
tal to strengthening pandemic preparedness and response. Most importantly, however, the United 
States and the international community should remain committed to pandemic preparedness. 
It is likely that the next international crisis will be a pandemic, and by following the recommenda-
tions laid out in this paper, the United States and the international community will move one step 
closer to swift and effective pandemic preparedness and response.
CONCLUSION
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